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The Future of International Mediated Settlement Agreements:  
Of Conventions, Challenges and Choices 
 
Eunice Chua Hui Han 
 
....Many practitioners have put forward the view that the attractiveness of conciliation 
would be increased if a settlement reached during a conciliation would enjoy a regime of 
expedited enforcement or would, for the purposes of enforcement, be treated as or 
similarly to an arbitral award. 
 






In 2002, UNCITRAL developed the Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation.1 Although at that stage there was a strong effort to develop a uniform 
enforcement mechanism, the ultimate conclusion was that because of the great variance in 
the technicalities of domestic procedural laws, harmonisation by way of uniform legislation 
was not feasible (UNCITRAL 2004: 55). Eventually, Article 15 merely provided that: 
 
If the parties reach and sign an agreement settling a dispute, that 
settlement agreement is binding and enforceable … [the enacting State 
inserts a description of the method of enforcing settlements agreements 
or refers to provisions governing such enforcement]. 
 
Nevertheless, in 2014, the United States (“US”) put forward a proposal to 
UNICTRAL, calling for the development of a multilateral convention on the enforceability 
of international commercial settlement agreements reached through conciliation, with the 
goal of encouraging conciliation in the same way that the New York Convention facilitated 
the growth of arbitration (UNCITRAL 2014: 3).  
 This article considers whether such a multilateral convention (let us call it an 
“enforcement convention” for short) is the best way forward, through an examination of 
both scholastic and empirical research. It also discusses the challenges that will be faced 
by an enforcement convention. However, before an enforcement convention comes to pass, 
various mechanisms are already available for parties to choose from to enforce their 
mediated settlements, including recording the settlement as an order of court and an arbitral 
award. Amongst others, the arbitration-mediation-arbitration (“Arb-Med-Arb”) service 
offered jointly by the newly established Singapore International Mediation Centre 
                                                          
 Eunice Chua Hui Han is the Deputy CEO of the Singapore International Mediation Centre (“SIMC”) and 
an Associate Mediator at the Singapore Mediation Centre. She is grateful to Professor Lawrence Boo for his 
support in the writing of this article and to her husband and family for their continual encouragement. The 
views expressed in this article are her personal views and do not represent those of SIMC. Eunice’s email 
address is eunicechua@simc.com.sg. 
 
 2 
(“SIMC”)2 and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) seeks to fill this 
gap and deserves closer examination. 
 
The Reasons Put Forward for an Enforcement Convention 
 
The call for an enforcement convention has been made by many scholars (see e.g. Boulle 
2014: 61; Lo 2014: 135; Wolski 2014: 106–108) and the reasons for this may be 
summarised as follows:  
 
 Provide certainty and finality through global recognition and enforcement of 
mediated settlement agreements;  
 Promote equity amongst parties from different countries in relation to enforcement 
of mediated settlement agreements, lacking up to now due to the variance in 
enforcement mechanisms as well as between mediated settlement agreements and  
settlement agreements obtained through arbitral or court proceedings;  
 Enhance efficiency and reduce dispute resolution transaction costs by allowing 
direct international enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. 
 
Empirical research also seems to suggest that there is some interest and support for 
an enforcement convention amongst the legal and business communities surveyed. In one 
anonymous online survey made available to “private practitioners, in-house counsel, 
government officials, neutrals and legal academics from around the world”, 221 responses 
were received, of which 68% stated that “the existence of an international convention 
regarding enforcement of an agreement to mediate or conciliate international commercial 
disputes would encourage parties in the respondent’s home jurisdiction to use mediation or 
conciliation in international commercial disputes” (Strong 2014: 6; 10; 41). 12% of 
respondents thought that an enforcement convention would not encourage mediation or 
conciliation and 20% selected “maybe”, citing the length of time that an enforcement 
convention could and would take to be adopted, as well as the fact that enforcement was 
only one of other concerns held by some parties, while recognising that an enforcement 
convention may be useful “from a communication and perception perspective” (Strong 
2014: 41–42). It should be noted that the nationalities of the respondents of this first survey 
were skewed towards the US (35%) and Europe (38%). 
In another, smaller scale, online survey of internal counsel and business managers, 
the vast majority of the 44 respondents indicated that they would either “probably” (40.5%) 
or “much more likely” (52.4%) mediate a dispute with a party from another country if they 
knew that country had ratified an enforcement convention; and that the existence of a 
widely-ratified enforcement convention would “definitely” (51.2%) or possibly” (36.6%) 
make it easier for commercial parties to come to mediation in the first place (IMI 2014). 
Similarly, when asked the extent that “the absence of any kind of international enforcement 
mechanism for mediated settlements present an impediment to the growth of mediation as 
a mechanism for resolving cross-border disputes”, 38.1% indicated that the absence of an 
enforcement convention was “a major impediment” and 52.4% indicated that it was “one 
deterring factor” (ibid). The geographic distribution of the respondents of this second 
survey is not known.  
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To some extent, the empirical research supports the reasons for an enforcement 
convention put forward by scholars. An enforcement convention would probably help to 
encourage the use of international commercial mediation by providing some certainty that 
mediated settlement agreements would be recognised and enforced; at the very least, this 
one concern would be addressed.  
It is unclear, however, based on the first survey, how strong the encouragement to 
mediate would be. Although the second survey suggests that the absence of an enforcement 
convention is regarded as a major impediment by a significant number of respondents, the 
small sample size from an unknown geographic distribution makes it difficult to draw a 
strong conclusion as to how widespread this view is. Nevertheless, in a follow up 
convention on “Shaping the Future of International Dispute Resolution”, it emerged from 
a “live” survey of 150 delegates from over 20 countries that: “85% of users, but only 47% 
of advisors see the need for an UNCITRAL convention on the recognition and enforcement 
of mediated settlements … No users, but over a quarter of advisors, voted against such a 
convention” (ibid). This suggests that there may be a much greater desire in the general 
business community than the legal community for an enforcement convention.  
Neither survey was designed to address the question of whether the perceived 
encouragement of mediation that would arise from an enforcement convention would be 
due to an improvement in the status of mediation, enhancement of efficiency, reduction of 
transaction costs or otherwise, and this could perhaps be an avenue for further research.  
 
The Challenges of an Enforcement Convention 
 
Although there are certainly valid reasons put forward for an enforcement convention, it is 
interesting that similar efforts to promote enforceability of mediated settlement agreements 
in the European Union (“EU”) and in the US have not been very successful, shedding light 
on some of the challenges of an enforcement convention.  
 
The Experience of the EU and the US 
 
Recognising that compliance with mediated settlement agreements should not depend on 
the good will of the parties, Article 6 of the EU Mediation Directive3 provides in relevant 
part that: 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that it is possible for the parties, or for 
one of them with the explicit consent of the others, to request that the 
content of a written agreement resulting from mediation be made 
enforceable. The content of such an agreement shall be made 
enforceable unless, in the case in question, either the content of that 
agreement is contrary to the law of the Member State where the 
request is made or the law of that Member State where the request is 
made does not provide for its enforceability. 
 
2. The content of the agreement may be made enforceable by a court of 
other competent authority in a judgment or decision or in an authentic 
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instrument in accordance with the law of the Member State where the 
request is made. 
 
Notably, Article 6 requires Member States to ensure that it is possible to request 
that the content of a mediated settlement agreement be made enforceable – but only where 
this request is made by “the parties” or “one of them with the explicit consent of the others”. 
In other words, the consent of all the parties is required before a mediated settlement 
agreement may be made enforceable. The mechanism for the mediated settlement 
agreement has also been left to the Member States – whether by way of judgment or 
decision of a court or other competent authority, or in an authentic instrument in accordance 
with the law of the Member State where the request is made.  
These limitations notwithstanding, five and a half years later the achievement of 
the aims of the EU Mediation Directive remains a long distance away. As a study requested 
by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs has observed, the EU Mediation 
Directive has done little to solve the “EU Mediation Paradox” – “[d]espite its proven and 
multiple benefits, mediation in civil and commercial matters is still used in less than 1% of 
the cases in the EU” (De Palo et al 2014: 1). It would be a great pity if an enforcement 
convention had as little impact as the EU Mediation Directive, and it would be important 
for those involved in the project to ensure that there is sufficient buy-in and impetus for 
concrete action before it is finalised. 
Even within a single country, the US, provision for the enforcement of mediated 
settlement agreements remains fraught with difficulty. Although the final draft of the US 
Uniform Mediation Act had included a provision allowing the parties to jointly request for 
a court to enter a judgment in accordance with the content of their mediated settlement 
agreement, this provision was not ultimately included. It was concluded that “by the time 
the provision was circumscribed sufficiently to protect rights”, it “would not add 
significantly to the law related to mediation” (Sussman 2009: 346). In a paradoxical 
development, it is the US that is now championing the enforcement convention cause 
before UNCITRAL. 
 
Drafting an Enforcement Convention 
 
Why is it that arriving at consensus seems so difficult to achieve? It is not too difficult to 
imagine what an enforcement convention could look like. The US proposal has broadly 
outlined the contours for an enforcement convention, and Professor Chang-fa Lo and 
Assistant Professor Winnie Jo-Mei Ma have even prepared a complete draft Convention 
on Cross-border Enforcement of International Mediated Settlement Agreements (“Draft 
Convention”), which of course anchors this issue of Tan Pan. Both these proposals confine 
the application of an enforcement convention to “international” settlement agreements of 
“commercial” matters, provide for the form of covered agreements and that covered 
agreements are binding and enforceable but subject to certain limited exceptions. Both 
these proposals also recognise the difficulties faced during the development of the Model 
Law on International Commercial Conciliation (and perhaps also informed by the US’s 
experience with the Uniform Mediation Act) and take the route of the New York 
Convention by leaving the states to provide a method for enforcement through their 
 5 
domestic legal systems without trying to harmonise “the specific procedure for reaching 
that goal” (UNCITRAL 2014: 5; Lo & Ma 2014: 399). 
However, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. For example, in relation to 
the mode of enforcement, although it is easy to agree that the specific procedure should be 
left to the individual states, should more guidance be provided? Akin to Article 6(2) of the 
EU Directive on Mediation, Article 5(1) of the Draft Convention provides very broadly 
that covered agreements shall “become enforceable by a court or other competent authority 
in a judgment, decision, or authentic instrument in accordance with the law of the 
Enforcing State”. This has left room for argument that the ability to sue on a mediated 
settlement agreement according to general contract law principles would suffice. 
Nevertheless, even with this very permissive provision, the EU experience shows us how 
difficult achieving positive results (in terms of the actual growth of the use of mediation) 
can be.  
Another difficult area will be the precise exceptions to enforceability, which the US 
proposal only broadly alludes to. Articles 4 and 6 of the Draft Convention illustrate how 
contentious this area could be.  
Article 4 of the Draft Convention provides for the documents that a party applying 
for enforcement shall supply, as well as what the mediated settlement agreement must 
include. Any requirement not being met would be a ground to refuse enforcement under 
Article 6. 
Article 4.1 distinguishes between institutional mediation and ad hoc mediation by 
requiring a mediated settlement agreement arising from ad hoc mediation to be signed by 
the mediator in addition to the parties, because “institutional mediation can be expected to 
have expertise in ensuring the necessary quality of the procedure and outcome through 
established rules and mechanisms” and because “it is more likely that conspiring parties 
can use ad hoc mediation to resolve fraudulent disputes … for illegal purposes” (Lo & Ma 
2014: 396). These two reasons make certain assumptions about institutional and ad hoc 
mediation which may be open to question.  
Article 4.2 provides certain requirements for a mediated settlement agreement 
including proof that the mediator and any organisation providing mediation services are 
“free from conflict of interest in the subject matter of the mediation” and proof that the 
“parties are provided with opportunities to present their cases or express their expectations 
from the mediation orally or through other means” (Lo & Ma 2014: 398–399). It seems 
unusual to require the organisation providing mediation services to prove that it is free from 
conflict of interest in the subject matter of the mediation, as the organisation is not the 
mediator and merely facilitates the administration and conduct of the process. It also does 
not take into account that the parties may decide to waive any conflict of interest due to the 
trust and respect they have for their selected mediator. The requirement for proof that 
parties are provided with opportunities to present their cases or express their expectations 
may also be problematic. If all that is required is exhibiting a document containing 
mediation rules or procedures then it is doubtful how something so formalistic could serve 
the purpose of the provision. If more is required then this may be too cumbersome.  
Article 6 of the Draft Convention is based largely on Article 5 of the New York 
Convention, with some of the exceptions relating to notice, scope of the arbitral award, 
composition of the arbitral tribunal and procedure removed as being inapplicable to 
mediation, and another exception added relating to the mediated settlement agreement 
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having been rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties or declared by a court of 
competent jurisdiction as enforceable. It is understandable and helpful for an enforcement 
convention to be aligned with the New York Convention, as there is already a large body 
of case law that will assist in interpretation of, for example, what incapacity is and what is 
contrary to public policy. However, whether further exceptions should be included will 
depend on what one sees as being fundamental to the mediation process, and there will be 
a great variety of such views. For example, some may view certain aspects of the mediation 
procedure being followed as crucial, and wish to incorporate some form of “breach of 
natural justice” exception.  
The difficulties associated with Articles 4 and 6 highlight a fundamental struggle 
faced by proponents of an enforcement convention – on the one hand, an enforcement 
convention is intended to encourage the use and growth of international commercial 
mediation; on the other hand, the success and workability of an enforcement convention 
require the mediation process to be recognisable and the mediation community, including 
users, institutions and mediators, to possess sufficient quality and skill. In addition, other 
policy considerations that throw doubt on the desirability of an enforcement convention 
will have to be addressed, including (see e.g. Boulle 2014: 61–64): 
 
 Reluctance to regulate a process which is intended to be flexible, informal and 
responsive; 
 Challenges of defining and describing mediation, particularly with very different 
cultures across the jurisdictions of the world; 
 Restriction on settlement outcomes to those that are legally enforceable, which may 
deprive a mediated settlement agreement of creativity and richness; 
 Impact on confidentiality of mediation. 
 
The drafting of an enforcement convention will be a very large hurdle to cross and 
also an important one. If this is not managed carefully, as one commentator has remarked, 
“an enforceability regime could reproduce the very legalities which parties have eschewed 
in the mediation” (Alexander 2009: 358–361).  
 
Alternative Choices  
 
In the meantime, without an enforcement convention, users of mediation who want their 
mediated settlement agreements to be directly enforceable4 may choose to enforce a 
mediated settlement agreement through two key avenues with the consent of all the other 
parties: (1) enforcement as a consent court order of a domestic court; and (2) enforcement 
as a consent arbitral award.  
These and others have been discussed in the literature (see e.g., Sussman 2009: 
345–359; Alexander 2009: 301–312; Wolski 2014: 95–99) and this article merely outlines 
them, along with considering how much the new Arb-Med-Arb offered jointly by SIAC 





If a court action had started before a mediated settlement agreement was achieved, it is 
possible in many jurisdictions to have the court record the mediated settlement agreement 
as a consent order of court, which is generally regarded as a final judgment of the court 
(Wolski 2014: 95). This was expressly contemplated in the EU Mediation Directive as well 
as the draft of the US Mediation Act (Sussman 2009: 354). Even if there are no court 
proceedings, some jurisdictions permit the courts to enter a judgment based on the 
mediated settlement agreement.5  
The difficulty with a court order is that it emanates from a domestic court. Unless 
there are pre-negotiated obligations to enforce in place, whether in the form of a 
multilateral or bilateral agreement, a court in another country is not obliged to recognise 




The mechanisms to seek enforcement as a consent arbitral award are varied and creative, 
and this article deals with three key versions: (1) through med-arb; (2) arb-med; and (3) 
arb-med-arb. Unlike a court award, an arbitral award may benefit from the enforceability 




Med-arb is generally understood as a tiered process where mediation is first attempted 
before arbitration. If a settlement agreement is arrived at after mediation, the parties then 
appoint an arbitrator (this may be the same person as the mediator) to have their agreement 
recorded as a consent arbitral award. If no settlement agreement is arrived at, the appointed 
arbitrator will proceed to hear the case.  
Although very efficient, med-arb poses some difficulties, as an arbitral award 
obtained in this manner may be open to challenge if sought to be enforced internationally 
under the New York Convention, on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator 
because no “difference” existed, by the time of appointment, on the basis of which an 
arbitral award could be issued (Wolski 2013: 262). To avoid this problem, it has been 
suggested that UNCITRAL could issue a recommendation or clarification to confirm the 
applicability of the New York Convention to international arbitration awards entered into 
with the consent of both parties as a result of a mediation (Sussman 2009: 12–13; also see 
generally Ma 2014).  
Further, where the mediator is the same person as the arbitrator, there may be issues 
of perceived or actual bias, as information disclosed in private sessions with the mediator 
may influence his or her decision-making as arbitrator (Wolski 2013: 259–260). This may 
also result in the inability to reap the full benefits of the mediation process, as parties may 
be wary of disclosing information to the arbitrator or may treat the mediation as an early 




Arb-med is the reverse of med-arb in that parties begin with the arbitration before 
mediation is attempted. One version of arb-med has the arbitrator prepare an award which 
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remains under seal and then take on the role of mediator after that; if the parties fail to 
reach a settlement agreement, the earlier drafted award is issued (Wolski 2013: 263–264). 
The largest problem with this approach is that unless the arbitration proceedings are quickly 
concluded and straightforward, there could be substantial and unnecessary costs incurred 
from everyone involved – the parties, counsel, and the arbitrator/mediator (ibid.). The 
rapport of the parties with the mediator and with each other may also be strained because 




Arb-med-arb is similar to arb-med in that arbitration is commenced before mediation. 
However, no award is prepared before mediation is attempted and hence there are fewer 
costs incurred. If parties are able to come to a settlement after mediation, they may return 
to the arbitral tribunal to have their settlement agreement recorded as a consent arbitral 
award. There is general agreement amongst commentators that this type of consent arbitral 
award will likely be enforceable under the New York Convention (Sussman 2009: 12; 
Wolski 2013: 261). This is arb-med-arb’s greatest advantage. However, arb-med-arb may 
be seen as more costly and less efficient than med-arb. In addition, it should be noted that 
where the arbitrator and the mediator are the same person, the problems described with 
med-arb above would apply.  
Nevertheless, taking all factors into consideration, arb-med-arb appears to be the 
best choice for parties concerned about international enforceability of their mediated 
settlement agreements and it is unsurprising that various institutions, including the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”), the International Chamber of 
Commerce and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre offer both arbitration and 
mediation services. In particular, the ICDR Arbitration Rules provide explicitly for some 
form of arb-med-arb, as Article 5 states that the administrator “may invite the parties to 
mediate in accordance with the ICDR’s International Mediation Rules” after the time for 
submission of an answer to the notice of arbitration and that the parties may agree to 
mediate at any stage of the proceedings. Pursuant to Article 5, mediation will proceed 
concurrently with arbitration should parties in arbitration choose to attempt mediation.  
The arb-med-arb service offered jointly by SIAC and SIMC is a unique offering, in 
the current scheme of things. The key features of the SIAC-SIMC arb-med-arb service are 
as follows.  
First, a clear and simple structure, contained in a document called the SIAC-SIMC 
Arb-Med-Arb Protocol. The Protocol currently has no equivalent elsewhere. It sets out the 
procedural steps of the arb-med-arb service, and may be applied by way of a dispute 
resolution clause in the contract6 or through the agreement of parties at any other time. 
Briefly, under the Protocol, arbitration is commenced by filing a notice of arbitration in 
accordance with the applicable arbitration rules (either SIAC Arbitration Rules or 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). An arbitral tribunal is appointed and after the exchange of 
the notice of arbitration and response to the notice of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal stays 
the arbitration and the matter is submitted to SIMC for mediation. The mediation shall be 
completed within 8 weeks from the date it commences unless the Registrar of SIAC in 
consultation with SIMC extends the time.  
 9 
Second, cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Under the Protocol, the parties pay 
combined fees and deposits to SIAC (the apportionment between SIAC and SIMC is dealt 
with institutionally) and the timelines and the process for transferal of a matter between 
SIAC and SIMC are all stated expressly. Thus, although two institutions manage one arb-
med-arb case, the parties are not put to any additional administrative hassle. Both the SIAC 
and SIMC have a transparent fee structure that is competitive, hence there is minimal 
additional cost between a pure arbitration at SIAC and the SIAC-SIMC arb-med-arb 
service.  
Finally, institutional backing, in the form of case management as well as 
appointment of suitable arbitrators and mediators for each case from international panels 
of high quality. SIAC and SIMC have separate panels of international arbitrators and 
mediators, published on their respective websites.7 SIMC’s mediators are required to be 
certified by the Singapore International Mediation Institute, which is an independent 
professional standards body.  
The SIAC-SIMC arb-med-arb has been described as “combin[ing] the best of both 
systems, granting the efficiency of mediation and the certainty and enforceability of an 
arbitral award” (Boog and Leimbacher 2015: 3). Another commentator writes (Chua 2014): 
“Two key factors … set the SIAC-SIMC [Arb-Med-Arb] Protocol apart – the clarity and 
certainty of the process, and the assurance of institutional support”.  
All in all, absent an enforcement convention, the SIAC-SIMC arb-med-arb service 
adds another valuable choice for the user. It may be employed not only in Singapore but 




The future of international mediated settlement agreements looks to be an exciting one, full 
of twists and turns, and it is hoped that this article has helped to outline some of what can 
be expected in the journey ahead. The UNCITRAL Working Group II meeting in February 
2015, which will consider the US proposal for an enforcement convention, will provide a 
platform for more detailed discussions, and it will be interesting to observe what the 
outcome of this first meeting will be. This author is optimistic that regardless of the 
progress of the UNCITRAL discussions and whether or not we eventually arrive at an 
enforcement convention, the fact of discussions on an enforcement convention, and the 
surrounding interest and buzz they have generated not only in the legal but also business 
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